**"*India's Nuclear Disarmament Policy – Cold War And Post Cold War Era: An Analysis***

# *SYNOPSIS*

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## Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science


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# INTRODUCTION

No century has seen as much human suffering and carnage as the 20th Century. The age of scientific creativity that began in the seventeenth century took an ominous turn when man used his knowledge of science to devise new ways and catastrophic ways to subjugate his fellow beings. The two World Wars saw more men dead that had died in all the previous wars. The most horrific moment came when the destructive force of the atom was used to wipe out the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Second World War. Ever since the horrors of modern war, in general and the nuclear weapons in particular, have become apparent, there is an overwhelming desire to see the end of such destructive forces.

This century has also seen the economic integration of the world economy. No country has spared any effort to improve the lot of its people through trade and commerce, and learning from the technological and developmental experiences of other countries. In such an integrated world there is a growing realization that force should not be an arbiter in international disputes.

It is in light of these changes that nuclear weapons have sought to be eliminated. Various regimes have been working out to curtail the development and proliferation of these weapons. Among the international arms control measures so far agreed or proposed for consideration, constraints on nuclear testing occupy a special place. Nuclear explosions are the most visible manifestations of the arms race. During past six decades, therefore, the pressure mounted through public opinion for the cessation of nuclear testing has been especially strong.

Development of nuclear technology, however, transformed the nature of global security. India reasoned that nuclear weapons were not weapons of war; these were weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear weapon free world would, therefore, enhance not only India's security, but also the security of all nations. In the absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, India made it clear that it cannot accept a regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots". India has always believed that it is the sovereign right of every nation to make a judgement regarding its supreme national interests and exercise its sovereign choice.

At the same time, India also recognized the fact that nuclear technology offers tremendous potential for economic development, especially for developing countries that are endeavouring to leap across the technological gaps created by long years of colonial exploitation. India is a ardent supporter of both universal and nuclear disarmament. India's foreign policy was shaped by Pandit Nehru and nuclear global disarmament was a significant part of it. As early as 1940, he had said,"We believe that complete disarmament of all nation-states should be aimed at, as an urgent necessity, if the world is not to be reduced to barbarism".[1] Since then India has been a staunch follower of global disarmament. Although India's stand on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), itself is fraught with controversy, India's relationship with nuclear proliferation and the call for universal disarmament go back a long way.

India was the first country to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954. This was followed up by many other initiatives, for example, on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the call for international negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an

international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another initiative in 1982, calling for a "nuclear freeze" i.e. prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons, and related delivery systems.[2] In 1954, after a major hydrogen bomb test conducted by the United States, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for negotiations for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. The world had, by then, witnessed less than 65 tests. However, India's call was not heeded.

In 1963, the PTBT was concluded to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and outer space, but by this time, countries had developed the technologies for conducting underground nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race continued unabated. More than three decades passed and after over 2000 tests had been conducted. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in 1996, following two and a half years of negotiations in which India participated actively. However, in its final shape, this treaty left much to be desired. It was neither comprehensive nor was it related to disarmament.

In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India had put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear-weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was absent when the NPT emerged in 1968. India's security concerns had deepened and India sought security guarantees from major nuclear powers of the world. The countries India appealed felt unable to extend to it the assurances that it had then

sought, that was when and why India made clear its inability to sign the NPT. India's decision not to sign the NPT, was in keeping with the basic objective of maintaining freedom of thought and action. In 1974, India demonstrated its nuclear capability. Successive governments, thereafter, continued to take all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve to safeguard India's nuclear option.

This was also the primary reason underlying the 1996 Indian decision of not subscribing to the CTBT. India's position was that by subscribing to the CTBT would severely limit its nuclear potential at an unacceptably low level. India's reservations deepened as the CTBT, also did not carry forward the process of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the decades of 1980s and 1990s witnessed the gradual deterioration in India's security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation.

**Nuclear Proliferation - Historical Background**

The development and use of nuclear weapon in 1945, marked a major turning point in the history of warfare and, indeed, in the history of humanity. Very quickly, enough nuclear warheads had been created and stockpiled to destroy civilization many times over giving humanity, for the first time, the capacity to end its own existence. As the cold war developed, the world thus fell under the shadow of 'the bomb'. During the cold war sometime seen as the 'first nuclear age' nuclear proliferation was primarily vertical rather than horizontal.

**Proliferation during Cold War**

**First Nuclear Age 1945 To 1990**

The first and only nuclear weapons that have been used in warfare were the atomic bombs, developed by Manhattan Project, which were exploded

over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively. Developed under the scientific direction of US physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, and first tested in the New Mexico desert on July 1945, these bombs represented an entirely new kind of weapons. The unprecedented destruction potential of nuclear weapons explains why the issue of Nuclear Proliferation has been at the forefront of the International Security Agenda since 1945.

The USA's atomic attack on Japan in 1945, therefore encouraged The Soviet Union to intensify its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, leading to the first Soviet nuclear tests in 1949. During the cold war the nuclear 'club' explained to include all five of the permanent members of UN Security Council (the P-5), with nuclear tests also being carried out by the UK (1952), France (1960), and China (1962). During the cold war greatest attention was given to restructuring the spread of nuclear arms race beyond the 'big five' particularly through the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was introduced in 1968 and extended indefinitely in 1995. Almost all states have signed the NPT, with notable exceptions of India, Pakistan and Israel. By contrast, during the period the USA and Soviet Union build up the capacity to destroy the world many times over.

## Nuclear Proliferation in the Post Cold War Era

### The Second Nuclear Age

The end of cold war produced early, optimistic expectations that the issue of nuclear proliferation would be of declining relevance. If East-West rivalry had fuelled the nuclear arms race and created a balance of terror, its end surely opened up the possibility that nuclear proliferation could also be ended, if not reversed. Such expectations were fuelled by the 1991, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and by START-II in 1993. Through which

the USA and Russia agreed, for the first time to reduce the number of their nuclear warheads to eliminate certain categories of weapons, such as land based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Such early optimism quickly faded, however. The Post cold war era, has been characterized by heightened anxiety about nuclear proliferation. This has happened for at least four reasons:

- Established nuclear powers continued use nuclear strategies.
- The incentives for states to acquire to nuclear weapons have increased.
- Proliferation is easier, as nuclear weapons and nuclear technology are more readily available.
- Fears have heightened that nuclear weapons may get into the 'wrong' hands.[3]
    - It was Bracken, however, who offered a structural examination of the Second Nuclear Age.[4] He located the 'roots' of the second nuclear age in Asia .The other factors identified by Bracken are multiplicity of player in the new nuclear game, the special role of the state in second nuclear age, the constraints posed by the extant nuclear order, the inability of new nuclear players to build costly command control systems and the 'second mover advantage' in Technological Development. To that list of factors we could now add the rise of non-state actors in the nuclear game; this has renewed the importance of civilian nuclear power in addressing the energy security requirements of major powers and the consequent difficulties building a farewell between peaceful and military uses of atoms.[5]

## Disarmament and its Theoretical Premises

The word disarmament is utilized in and extremely general sense and as such it connote the ideas of limitation of, or control, or reduction of armaments. Within this term there is a distinction between qualitative disarmament which refers to the limitation or prohibition of certain types of weapons only and quantitative disarmament which refers to control over the weapons of all categories. And yet there is another distinction between general disarmament and comprehensive disarmament. General disarmament is one in which all or most of the Great powers participate but not necessarily to with a commitment to do away with all types of categories of weapons. On the other hand comprehensive disarmament is In recent years these question have been taken up with a realistic point of view both by scholars and the statesman. There is a growing realization that nuclear weapons pose the great danger to mankind and hence there could be at least disarmament of nuclear weapons. This realization is based on appreciation of the fact that the international conflicts cannot be eliminated and that the substitute for armament cannot be found without the involvement of world community which seems to be difficult in the foreseeable future. Thus there is strong advocacy of partial disarmament that is nuclear disarmament. The main focus of disarmament negotiations since the test ban treaty of 1963 has been on nuclear disarmament.

## Question of Nuclear Disarmament

Question of nuclear disarmament has various facets. It includes the reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation or non dispersion of nuclear weapons, and check on the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The abolition of existing nuclear weapon is a measure of

arms control non proliferation is akin to disarmament in one respect and to arms control in another. For the term non-proliferation refer today to not only putting a stop to nuclear arms race but also the problem of disarmament is today identified as the problem of non- proliferation or non dispersion of nuclear weapons, some writers however distinguish between non-proliferation and non-dissemination .The former means stopping the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers to non nuclear weapon states, where the latter refers to a check on the sharing of nuclear secrets by nuclear power with non-nuclear weapon states.

The ultimate idea in both the cases is to prevent the expansion of nuclear club is a problem of only the horizontal spread of nuclear weapon, whether by proliferation or dissemination. What is also important is a check against the vertical spread of nuclear weapons, that is the further spread of nuclear weapons in those countries which already posses nuclear weapons.

**India and Nuclear Disarmament**

India's very first articulation on nuclear disarmament, after its emergence as modern state, provided a unique conceptualisation of the term. India has not seen disarmament as an end in itself. The ultimate objective have been to abolish war by removing its cause or goals, as set forth in UN Charter. Within this larger scheme of things, nuclear disarmament has constituted one step .In order to facilitate its pursuance, India has, from time to time, prioritised its efforts along smaller in terms steps, such as placing a freeze on further production of nuclear weapons, putting an end to nuclear testing, negotiating a cut off in production in fissile materials for weapons and a reduction and eventual destruction of nuclear stockpiles. Similarly a disarmament regime would have to be designed to enable state to rearm at

essentially equal intensity,[6] so that even if there is re-armament race it does not become dangerous.

A notable feature of India's nuclear disarmament policy has been its strong advocacy of complete disarmament, with nuclear disarmament being accorded the highest priority. India wants to eliminate nuclear weapon totally to enhance global security and India's own national security. Towards this end India has taken several initiatives within and outside UN. In 1988, India put forward a 'Comprehensive plan for total elimination of weapons of mass destruction' in a phased manner. In order to highlight international concern about unprecedented nuclear arms race, India was also a member of the six nation five-continent joint initiative in the 1980s.

In May 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests some doubts were raised in the international community about India's commitment to disarmament. In order to eliminate these doubts, India made it clear that these tests were conducted in context of national security and the prevailing international system and declared a 'no -first- use' of nuclear weapons. While India has scrupulously refrained from proliferation, A.Q. Khan of Pakistan has sold the nuclear technology and know-how to North Korea, Libya and violated their own voluntary commitment to the agreed obligation to the NPT; but all these examples have exposed the double standard other approved 'weapon powers'.[7] Former Indian Foreign secretary Shyam Sraran says that the basic tenet of India's nuclear policy since independence has been the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. India's status as a nuclear weapon state does not diminish its commitment to the objective of a nuclear free world. Aspiring for a non- violent world order, through global, verifiable and non discriminatory nuclear disarmament continues to be an important plank

of Indian nuclear policy, which is characterised by restraint, responsibility, transparency, predictability and a defensive orientation as a responsible nuclear power with impeccable credentials on non-proliferation. India has earned increasing international recognition against proliferation. As a result, the historical inhibition of the US to share nuclear technology and fuel changed the perception of the US changed the new nuclear deal would therefore, enable India to satisfy its quest for nuclear energy for civilian purpose.

India's nuclear weapon policy took shape between late 1950s and early 1970's partly in response to a series of shocks the 1962 border war with China, the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosions, and the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan.[8] The Gandhian conception of international society, and of India's role within it gave way to a harder approach based upon real politic. Security had to rest on power and power on capabilities. A distinctive nuclear paradigm endured in the subsequent years, the attributes of which can be summarized as follows:

- India on its own: India had to be able to look after itself as its history suggested that foreign powers were only interested in subjugation and hence, alliances could not be trusted.

- Nuclear weapons confer status, security and leverage. This was evident from the prominent positions attained by the five (P-5) Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), since 1945, reinforced by their permanent membership in the UN Security Council. India's desire for status was further heightened by China's increased recognition as a great power after 1964, for security by Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons after 1971 and for leverage by the perception that a non-nuclear India would

remain prone to be being pushed around by the US and other nuclear powers.

- The NPT is primarily an instrument of great power politics and only secondarily an instrument of collective security NPT and associated trade controls have been developed against the developing world. Also, the NPT confers power on a small minority of states while denying it to the large majority.

- Nuclear weapons are Immortal Mahatma Gandhi in the last two years of life spoke frequently of the immorality of nuclear weapons. Their Development was... "deadening the first feeling that has sustained mankind for ages."[9] This strain of thinking survives in India's persistent call for complete nuclear disarmament. India's nuclear paradigm became associated with three prescriptions. Firstly, that India should develop the option to deploy nuclear weapons. Second, that India should become self-reliant in the technologies pertaining to nuclear weapons. Third, capacity to produce weapon grade material should be established. Over the years, some set of beliefs attained considerable intellectual and operational coherence. It gained solidity from nascent Pakistani nuclear weapons program, from shared interest with countries in the non-aligned movement (such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Yugoslavia), and from the punishment that was meted out to India, particularly in the form of technology denial.

Thus main adjuncts of India's nuclear posture [10] have been:

- Use of nuclear energy for peaceful proposes only.

- Pursuit of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

- Refusal to sign the NPT, enters nuclear free zone arrangements, or Join bilateral or international agreements that are either discriminatory or non universal.
- Declaration that India's 1974 underground nuclear test was for peaceful purposes and that India retains the right to test again.

By the 1990s, India found itself responding to major changes in the international environment, which if not completely destabilized its nuclear policy, certainly unsettled it. These included the geopolitical changes ensuing the end of Cold War and shifts in the location of economic dynamism; the maturation of Pakistan's nuclear weapon program and deepening of conflict over Kashmir; international developments in arms reductions and non-proliferation policies; and the negotiation and the conclusion of CTBT. Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs observes:

No other country has deliberated so carefully and at times, torturously over the dichotomy between its sovereign security needs and global disarmament instinct, between a moralistic approach and a realistic one, and between a covert nuclear policy and overt one. May 11, 1998 changed that all. Suddenly the strategic equipoise of the post-Cold World War was rattled. The entire non-proliferation regime and the future of disarmament were at the forefront of the international agenda.[11]

The end of the cold war did not change the discriminatory and self aggrandizing attitude of the nuclear weapon powers on non-proliferation issues. This static and self-serving approach of the nuclear weapon states was manifested in all the discussions related to non-proliferation of every category of weapons held after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

India's disarmament initiatives also got muted in the light of the controversy over possible nuclear weapons in South Asia. Frequent counter-proposals made by Pakistan, such as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia, mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities and a bilateral test ban, also forced the west to perceive a dichotomy between India's global disarmament initiatives and the nuclear reality of South Asia. India rejected these proposals arguing that they were conceived in the narrow context of South Asia, ignoring the global reach of the nuclear disarmament issue.

**IMPORTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The end of cold war did not bring the expected peace dividend for India; instead it accentuated the Indian security problems. India was confronting a radically transformed world order, with few reliable friends. The importance of self-help in managing its national security was coming to the fore with greater clarity. New question about India's nuclear option were now being debated.

With the nuclear tests of India in May 1998, the strategic equipoise of the post cold war era got significantly unsettled and question of fundamental importance to entire no proliferation regime and the future of disarmament debate get placed at the forefront of international agenda as India has emerged a classic case in international community does India's policy on nuclear disarmament has changed after post cold war or it remained same as in cold war period. It shows the significance and relevance of study to analyse India's stand on nuclear disarmament in the cold war and post cold war era.

## Review of Literature:

Review of existing literature is desirable to know what works have been done in the area of proposed research, what has been still open for further research. For the purpose of the research work, The researcher has gone through a number of books, journals, articles, books reviews, reports, newspapers clippings, conference proceedings .

**C. Raja Mohan's** chapter **in "The second nuclear age"** has pointed that ,this, 'nuclear reconciliation between the global nuclear order and India must be seen as a consequence of the change in the international distribution of power as well as the perceived need to adopt to the changing dynamics of nuclear politics in cold war period '. According to author main challenge facing the nuclear order has been its inability to integrate emerging powers and the emergence of a second nuclear age. According to author, that forced the hegemonic power, the U.S., to restructure the prevailing nuclear order. Given India's revisionist aspiration vis-a-vis the global nuclear order, it was more than willing to go along. Author has underlined the crucial role of India in emerging balance of power in Asia, and its impact on the bush administration's attitude towards the reconfiguration on the non nuclear non proliferation regime.

**Jason A .Kirk's** "**Evolution of India's nuclear policies"**edited in Sumit Ganguly (2010). The author has divided this chapter into two part .The first part of the chapter put light on key historical junctures and development in India's nuclear policies to the Pokhran-II test of May 1998, with international systematic domestic-political and individual leadership factors. In the second part writer focused on India's nuclear doctrine in the post 1998 period and examined detailed nuclear dimension of a force mobilization episode in 2001-2002 , a serious nuclear crisis in the long running India -Pakistan conflict. By tracing entire arc of this still unfolding story linking-development in the pre and post 1998 periods-writer has analysed that in addition to understand India's nuclear policies as a response to specific threats from China and Pakistan, one should also understand them as a reaction to the evolution of the global non proliferation regime and relatedly, to shift in the international and regional balance of power : from post cold war unipolarity and a new triangular South Asian security dynamics involving ,India ,Pakistan and U.S.

**Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik's (1999) "Nuclear politics and future of global disarmament"** has seven chapters. The authors have given a historical overview of nuclear age to the present, aiming at to situate the more specific politics of cold war and the post cold war international politics. They have also focused on the more specific story how and why India and Pakistan trod the path of nuclearisation .Two central chapters of the book has been devoted to the unique evil of nuclear weapon and their unique danger. The intent of authors is not merely to evoke moral outrage, but to stress the centrality of the generation of controlled moral anger if the effort to bring about a world free forever of nuclear weapon is ever to succeed .In the later part of the book they have attacked the nuclear mind set not just at its weakest point but also as its supposedly strongest point -its claim to promoting strategic security through reliance on the wondrous power nuclear deterrence. Subsequent chapters look more closely at the combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factor that have shaped not just the political context in which India and Pakistan took their decision. In this book authors have tried to analyze that what lesson of the past are on which we must think upon, and should work for a nuclear free world.

**Praful Vidwai and Achin Vanaik's (2002)"New nukes; India, Pakistan and global nuclear disarmament"** the authors in the preface of the book have stated that the book contribute to the goal of '(eradicating) the nuclear scourge forever'. Though subtitle India, Pakistan and global nuclear disarmament the emphasis in the text lies much more heavily on India than Pakistan. The best piece of analysis in the text, however, is the chapter entitled 'South Asia in the nuclear trap; which consists of a well argued assessment of the south Asian nuclear dilemma. The subject is, of course, a vast one and book moves between the history of the situation, the economics of obtaining and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, Just war theory and the question of the utility of a realist approach and its flaws in relation to nuclear deterrence. The mapping out a new approach to nuclear abolition is drawn together largely in the final chapter, in which authors examines four possibilities: nuclear

weapons free zones; the comprehensive test ban treaty and fissile cut off treaty; a no-first-use pledge; de-alerting of nuclear weapons. These are cited as ways in which disarmament may be ultimately be pursued. New nukes ends as it begins, with a call to arms (so to speak) for the anti nuclear movement, both within South Asia and worldwide. It is timely and important contribution to the subject.

**David Cortright and Mattoo "India and the bomb: public opinion and nuclear option"** have given a vivid description on nuclear policy and disarmament. each chapter of book has presented viewpoints regarding India's nuclear weapon option has also been defended by the argument that India's security is seriously threatened by Chinese and increasingly by Pakistan nuclear weapons. Thus both India's international standing and security are often thought to require nuclear weapons, or, at minimum, a capacity to produce them when needed. Against this backdrop the opinion survey conducted and interpreted by author has provided an interesting glimpse into the thinking of Indian elites on nuclear weapons and prospects for their dismantling. Authors have analysed that two central determinants of Indian policy support for global nuclear disarmament and the defence India's political and military autonomy are clashing. This means that the traditional policy of nuclear ambiguity, though still enjoying extensive support among Indian elites, is under increasing pressure. As a result New Delhi may be forced to more implicit choices regarding nuclear weapons, favouring rather than opposing them.

**Ashwani k. Chopra's "India's policy on disarmament"** six chapters have given a clear understanding on disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons. The author has discussed issues in proper perspectives in the context of disarmament in details. In the first chapter author has described India's role in disarmament negotiations, and its initiatives towards matters connected with disarmament. In the Second chapter author has given a insight India's policy toward disarmament of conventional weapons. Besides discussing India's policy on disarmament towards matters like "reduction of military budget" "demobilization of armed forces " subsequent chapters has analysed India's policy on nuclear disarmament and also

focused on India's attitude towards the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons and its assessment on N.P.T. from the point of view of disarmament, security and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Author has also analysed the India's policy towards peaceful use of nuclear energy and with special reference to its attitude towards the establishment of I.A.E.A.

**Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Weapons in the Information age (2012)** This book talks about today's information age, the coexistence of nuclear weapons with advanced conventional weapons and information-based concepts of warfare is a military contradiction. Nuclear deterrence was initially predicated on geopolitical, military, and technical assumptions. These were based on Cold War politics, rational deterrence theory, the concept of mutual vulnerability, and

the fact that information and technology diffusion were limited. Today, however, far from being obsolete, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by —outlier regimes or terrorists, such as North Korea. It shows that restricting nuclear proliferation should still be on the agenda of policymakers, and calls for a revitalized global non- proliferation regime. This unique survey by a leading expert will appeal to anyone interested in arms control, nuclear proliferation, and defense policy.

**Shyam Bhatia" India's Nuclear Bomb "(1979)** This book comprehensively tals about Indira Gandhi initial decision to go ahead with a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion(PNE) in1971. Author writes that Indira Gandhi appears to have been influenced position. However, by the time test was carried out in 1974. India's international relations had improved considerably. The fact that India experienced serious domestic unrest between 1971 and 1974 could shed some light on the prime minister's decision to go ahead with the test anyway, in an attempt to improve domestic morale and divert attention from internal economic and political problems that were plaguing the government.

**Kalpana Chitranjan ,"Five decades of Nuclear Weapons "(1998**) In this book author takes a dive into history to trace the origin of nuclear weapons. Through a factual account, author demonstrates how the world has been veering on the paths. She traces Indian struggle for nuclear disarmament that begin from the time the country emerged as a independent state. It casts significant doubt on the wisdom of traditional Western approaches on the issues that exclusively emphasized non-proliferation. The Indian case has exposed the fallacy of this approach and reinforced the need to pursue universal and non-discriminatory disarmament as the only effective solution to the problem of proliferation.

**George Perkovich "India's Nuclear Bomb: The impact of Global Proliferation" (2001**) The author has given comprehensive analytical history of India's nuclear explosion program from it is inception in 1947 to May 1998 nuclear tests. In his well researched and documented study, the author has concluded that India's nuclear Program was not solely the result of military need, but the efforts of, Indian Scientists who secretly developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capabilities, and extremely small number of politician in Indian leadership including several prime ministers who played important role. Author has more focused on external factors which have shaped India's nuclear policy and has missed on the accounts of role of the coalition politics. He has interwoven the complex relationship among India, US, Pakistan, and china regarding nuclear bombs, Pointing out that none steadfast to its principles. According to author moral and political doubts, domestic turmoil, and compelling national and international priorities were also major factors in shaping up of India's Nuclear Policy.

**Vijai K. Nair " No More Ambiguity : India's Nuclear Policy" (2002)** The author in his work on Indian Nuclear policy has traced the ambiguities on various issues in the official stance of India on nuclear weapons, their use, stockpiling and nuclear realtions with other countries . Author has argued that Insia as newly independent country after 1947 resumed nuclear weapons as destabilizing fsctor thst threatens security environment globally. When China attacked India in 1962 and later on after two years it declared to have nuclear weapons that changed India's

perception.

Author has pointed out that nuclear disarmament has always remained bed rock of Indian policy and it is even to date also. Indian nuclear policy is guided by two important principles namely minimum deterrence and no first use.

**Articles:**

**N.D Jayaprakash** "Nuclear disarmament and India**"** has analysed the point that many people are not aware from the fact that it was India who first introduced the proposal which led to NPT and CTBT. Subsequently India refused to become a party either of them because of the gross changes in the original draft at the instance of U.S., which qualitatively overturned the intent and purpose of these proposals. Similarly, CTBT a treaty to end all tests which led to serve an initial step in nuclear disarmament, first ended up a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which left the door open for unbridled underground test and remained delinked from the issue of nuclear disarmament .Some thirty (30) years later, the CTBT was resurrected, but just as before, it has ended up being yet another versions of PTBT and totally divorced from issue of nuclear disarmament. The present CTBT has survival peculiar features which give evidence of U.S. double strands on disarmament issues. Should humanity be the part of deceit or should it put an end to this game once and for all and bring the issue of prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament to the centre stage.

**Arjun Makhijani and Michilo Kaku** "Nuclear disarmament and its verification" have analysed that the process of nuclear disarmament require a procedure for its verification has been limited to remote means. For instance, satellite photos help to verify the deployment of strategic missiles covered by the strategic arms limitation talks. However a comprehensive bilateral freeze on the production and deployment of all nuclear weapon and delivery systems followed by bilateral reductions will require physical verification. This may become necessary even for some strategic nuclear weapons; such as Cruise missiles now being produced in the United States. Finally, as in the past, the lack of physical verification process is being used as an excuse by those who want to continue the nuclear arms build-up. The process of nuclear disbarment and its verification must express the reality that all-out nuclear war

between U.S. and Soviet Union threaten everyone .It is therefore up to the nuclear disarmament movement to show the way to a process which can help to unite the world's people to overcome the common danger of nuclear annihilation.

**Achin Vanaik's** "Nuclear disarmament: building a movement in south Asia" has clarified thinking in respect of building a strong disarmament movement in India, specifically, and in South-Asia more in general. According to author the principal the principal regional goal of our nuclear disarmament movement can only be the call and the demand for a south Asian weapon free zone: from a political-tactical point of view this is far superior to alternatives like calling for unilateral disarmament in India or Pakistan. Author has analysed that there are always two stages in the process of developing an effective progressive force like the nuclear disarmament movement, wheter regionally in South Asia ;or globally. In the first phase it cannot hope to change policy but aims to attack and undermine the popular legitimacy that all government seeks to obtain from public policies. It is only when such disarmament movement develops on a very large scale and achieves a critical mass that they can then hope to impact on actual policy. The Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear weapon movement are, and will remain for a considerable period of time, in the first phase, but to expand in the second phase, the prerequisite conditions are same-to develop in appropriate political perspectives to develop the necessary organisational and practices to carry out such activities successfully.

**Zafar nawaz Jaspal** "Towards nuclear zero in south Asia: a realistic narrative "has analysed that president Obama's expressed desire about nuclear free world seems unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. India and Pakistan have adopted an apathetic approach towards the concept of nuclear zero, because the intellectual and political movement in favour of a nuclear weapon free South Asia suffers from unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions and unrealistic expectations. New Delhi and Islamabad have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease mistrust between them. Thus they are continuing to produce fissile

material and manufacturing, testing and adding dual-capable ballistic, cruise-missiles to their arsenals. The India specific amendment in the nuclear suppliers group export guidelines in Sept. 2008 has further toughened Pakistan's stance in the conference of disarmament on the idea of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

**T.V Paul "The Systematic bases of India's Challenge to the global nuclear order" (1998)** .The author argues that India's nuclear behavior is located in longer global and regional nature of systematic approach. A systematic approach would explain security behavior of state interims of its position in international system and how position is objected by interaction between it and major power reaction. According to author systematic constraints posed India to change its policy and adjust it towards the changing international scenario. The aspiration of becoming a great power in international system inclined India to possess nuclear and marks a foothold in global power hierarchy. India was forced to nuclearisation as current system deny any legitimate place in international order and have no intervention of illegality India in the system. Moreover nuclear weapon would serve as key to using power and would provide major technological breakthrough in conventional capacity.

**Gaurav Kampani "From Existential Deterence to minimum Deterrence" (1998)** The Author in this article argues about the shift from moral perception of reluctance towards nuclear weaponisation to acceptance towards nuclearisation. Earlier it was existential deterrence, unorganized nuclear authority to articulate no first use doctrine

## Statement of the Problem

In the context of present research problem the meaning and chronological history of proliferation of nuclear weapon and India's nuclear policy would be analysed and especially emphasis would be on India's nuclear disarmament policy in cold War and post cold war period. The main purpose of the study is to analyse India's Perspective on nuclear disarmament policy in Pre and Post Cold war period. The Problem is titled as below:

***"India's Nuclear Disarmament Policy –cold War and Post Cold War Era: An***

***Analysis"***

## Objectives OF THE STUDY

1) To understand arms race and nuclear disarmament and its various aspects.
2) To study the historical roots of proliferation of nuclear weapons and India's perspective.
3) To analyse India's nuclear policy.
4) To analyse India's nuclear disarmament policy in Cold War and Post cold war era.
5) To analyse challenge for comprehensive and effective nuclear disarmament in the 21st century scenario.

## Research Methodology:

Methodology is an important dimension for doing any kind of research or acquiring any kind of knowledge about social facts or social reality. The relevance of methodology especially in social sciences can't be denied. Research methodology in social sciences from its very inception remained debatable issue for social philosopher and theorist. There are many philosophical schools, which proposed their solutions for diverse social problems and suggested various methods for acquiring knowledge about these problems and suggested various methods for acquiring knowledge about these social problems. The tools, techniques and procedure, followed for conducting research, constitute the framework of research methodology.

The work is based on the Library research, content analysis. For this purpose both types of data from primary and secondary resources has been used.

Methodology is descriptive, analytical and is based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources includes official document of various disarmament conferences and parliamentary speeches and documents and secondary sources includes important books of concerned topic, journals, magazines newspapers clipping and publications etc including the internet sources.

Primary Sources

a. Annual reports of ( Ministry of External and Ministry of Defense )
b. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements and treaties.
c. Foreign Affairs Record.
d. Selected Parliamentary Debates.
e. Conventions
f. Rules, Regulations, Orders.
g. Legislations

Secondary Sources

a. Text-Books , Reference books .
b. Encyclopedias
c. Journals
d. Articles
e. Newspapers Clippings.
f. Online resources like J STOR.

**Research Design**

Research design is descriptive in nature .Research design is the basis upon which data is collected for the purpose of a research work and observations are made on numerous fronts. Therefore, it helps in carrying

out a research plan successfully and provides the empirical and logical basis for drawing conclusions and gaining knowledge in an orderly way

Delimitation of study

Expected outcome of proposed work:

Research Hypothesis

**Hypothesis**

1. India's nuclear programme was the direct outcome of the economic compulsions of the country.
2. The nuclear dilemma confronted by the threats from the neighbouring countries and other nuclear powers have compelled India to keep its nuclear option open.
3. After 1998 tests India had to fashion a practical and effective deterrent as a response to the evolving international situation, particularly in the light of deteriorating regional security environment.
4. India's earliest attempts into the question of nuclear disarmament were admittedly more moralistic, but after cold war India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little realistic.
5. The conduct of tests in May, 1998, has been given a decisive shift in India's nuclear policy in general, and test ban policy in particular.

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